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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

organization in question is a rural water association; (2) that
association is indebted to the RECDS; and (3) the association
"provides or makes service available" to the area in question. Since LeAx satisfied the first two elements, the court focused its examination
on the third qualification.
The court used the "pipes in the ground" test from a Tenth Circuit
decision holding, wherein an association "makes service available" if it
has "proximate and adequate" pipes in the ground to provide service
within a reasonable time. Because of the relative proximity of Le-Ax's
current pipes to the UE site, the court held that Le-Ax would be able
to provide or make service available.
The City claimed that Congress never intended for § 1926(b) to
"grant water districts an exclusive right to service a site that: (a) is
outside of the district's state-law defined area; (b) is wholly unrelated
to any federal indebtedness the water district has incurred; (c) the
water district has no legal obligation to serve; and (d) has never been
served by the water district before." The court noted, as a regional
water district, Le-Ax had a legal right to provide water service to any
unincorporated areas "within and without the district," regardless of
prior service to the area or any direct relationship to its federal
indebtedness.
Finally, the City argued construing § 1926(b) so broadly violated
Ohio's Tenth Amendment rights by infringing on powers reserved for
the state. Because Ohio voluntarily subjected itself to § 1926(b), and
because "Ohio retains the general authority to control water service
within the state," the court held the statutory provision "[did] not
improperly interfere with state or municipal sovereignty because the
limits it impose [d] [were] restricted in scope."
Thus, the court granted Le-Ax's motion for summary judgment,
enjoined the City from providing water service to UE, and granted a
declaratory judgment asserting that the City's arrangement violated 7
U.S.C. § 1926(b).
KatharineJEllison
STATE COURTS
ALABAMA
Water Works & Sewer Bd. v. Randolph, No. 1002182, 2002 Ala. LEXIS
34 (Ala. Feb. 1, 2002) (finding that a public corporation organized
under section 11-50-310 of the Alabama Code is not subject to the
reporting requirements of the Sunshine Law).
Members of the Water Works & Sewer Board of the City of Selma
("Board") held a private meeting, excluding Samuel Randolph, a
member of the Board. During the private meeting, the mayor of
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Selma was dismissed as superintendent of the Board. Thereafter, the
Board members filed a declaratory judgment as to their authority to
dismiss the mayor. Samuel Randolph brought this action against the
Board and its remaining members for violating the Sunshine Law by
conducting a secret meeting of the Board without notice to the public.
Randolph sought a judgment declaring the actions of the Board void,
and requested an award of attorney fees.
The trial court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order that
blocked the Board from enforcing its decision to terminate the mayor.
The Board challenged the trial court's jurisdiction on the ground that
the Board members had a pending declaratory judgment, and on the
ground that the Sunshine Law did not apply to the Board. The trial
court held that the Board was subject to the Sunshine Law and that its
private meeting was illegal. Consequently, the trial court found the
Board's actions taken at the private meeting were void and it
permanently enjoined the Board from engaging in any future secret or
illegal meetings. The Board appealed.
The Alabama Sunshine Law, section 13A-14-2 of the Alabama
Code, expressly prohibits secret, executive meetings of enumerated
state boards, commissions or courts.
On appeal, the Alabama
Supreme Court acknowledged that the Sunshine Law did not expressly
list public corporations or water boards as subject to the statute.
Therefore, the court noted that whether the statute applied to water
boards incorporated as public corporations was a question of first
impression. In interpreting the statute, the court noted that it must
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature as expressed by
the statute. In doing so, a court may explain the language, but it may
not detract from or add to the statute. Further, when the language of
the statute is clear, there is no room forjudicial construction.
The court then determined that it must interpret the meaning of
the "catchall phrases" listed in the Sunshine Law. Further, the court
concluded that Randolph had the burden of proving that public funds
or grants received or disbursed by the Board were funds belonging to
the state, county or municipality. Randolph asserted that the Board
was a utility that received and disbursed public grants because it
provided water, sewer and garbage services, and it collected fees from
the public for performing these services.
The court interpreted section 11-50-314 of the Alabama Code, the
statutory basis for the Board's creation, as contemplating that monies
used by a public corporation in operating its business would come
from revenues it generated and from borrowing money. The court
reasoned that although the Board's customers were also residents of
the municipality, this did not convert the revenue received by the
Board into municipal funds. Thus, the court held that the Board did
not receive or distribute municipal funds, and that Randolph failed to
meet his burden. The court further reasoned that because no
statutory authority existed to confer "any legislative or judicial
function" to the Board, and because the Board did not exercise any
legislative orjudicial function, it was not subject to the Sunshine Law.
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The court held that the Sunshine Law did not apply to the Board,
a public corporation organized under section 11-50-310, and reversed
the judgment of the trial court, including the award of attorney fees,
and rendered judgment in favor of the Board.
ChristopherA. Giffin
ARIZONA
In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River
Sys., 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001) (vacating portion of Superior Court's
earlier order upon interlocutory review and holding the "practicably
irrigable acreage" standard insufficient as the exclusive quantification
method for determining water rights on Indian lands).
In September 1988, the Superior Court held Indian reservations
were entitled to "such water as is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
that reservation," and applied the "practicably irrigable acreage"
("PIA") method for quantifying the amount of water necessary for
each reservation. This method calculated the minimal amount of
water necessary to supply "those acres susceptible to sustained
irrigation at reasonable costs." Granting an interlocutory review, the
court held the PIA method insufficient, ruling each reservation's water
needs be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Water users in Arizona acquire water rights through an
appropriation and seniority system wherein rights are lost if the
appropriator does not make use of them for a period of five years.
Indian reservations, as federal lands, acquire water rights upon
creation of the reservation, and are not required to maintain the use
of the water. In establishing federal lands, whether Indian reservations
or national parks, the government "impliedly reserves enough water to
fulfill the [primary] purpose of each such reservation." Thus, federal
water rights entail only a reservation's minimal need. If a secondary
purpose arises, rights for that purpose are subject to the prior
appropriation doctrine.
The trial court assumed the primary use of water on Indian
reservations would be for agricultural irrigation. To determine the
amount of water allotted to a reservation, the trial court applied the
PIA standard. The Arizona Supreme Court found PIA to be inherently
flawed for failing to take into account the different geographical
topographies, cultures, and skills of the various reservations. The
location of many reservations does not allow agricultural pursuits, nor
are many tribes able to sustain themselves solely from growing crops.
The Arizona Supreme Court held the primary purpose in
establishing Indian reservations was to provide a "permanent
homeland" for the Native Americans, a homeland inherently entailing
various uses of water. The court intended for lower courts to grant
water rights to reservations on a subjective basis, considering "parties'

